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FORTIFICATIONS 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A   SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  4896-4 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


513 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


• .  •     •  •  •     •  •/  •  ♦ 


«      •    • 
•  -•  •   •, 


¥ 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  513. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff . 


D 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Introduction, 

Page, 

1.  Influence  of  forts  and  fortified  cities,  as  distinguished  from  intrenched  areas, 

upon  operations  on  land 5 

Fortifications  of  Liege 5 

Fortifications  of  Namur  and  along  the  French  frontier 6 

Antwerp ...  7 

Verdun 7 

Przemysl  and  the  Russian  fortifications 7 

The  fortified  city  of  the  future 8 

2.  Influence  of  seacoast  fortifications  with  particular  reference  to  the  attack  by 

allied  fleet  on  Dardanelles  fortifications 10 

Description  of  the  Dardanelles 10 

^  Fortifications  of  the  Dardanelles 10 

(a)  Power  of  the  guns 11 

(6)  Character  of  the  batteries 12 

Reduction  of  the  forts  at  the  entrance 12 

Operations  against  the  forts  at  the  narrows 13 

Final  attack  of  March  18 13 

Efficiency  of  seacoast  fortifications 14 

Requisites  for  successful  defense 15 

Necessity  for  mobile  troops 15 

3.  Summary  of  attempt  to  take  Dardanelles  fortifications  by  mobile  troops 16 

Initial  delay 16 

Terrain 17 

Strength  of  forces 17 

Allies'  plan 17 

Landings  at  south  end  of  peninsula 18 

Landing  by  the  Australian-New  Zealand  corps 19 

Diversion  by  the  French 19 

Attempts  to  advance 19 

Landing  at  Suvla  Bay  and  subsequent  operations 20 

Necessity  for  heavy  mobile  guns 21 

The  value  of  mobile  troops  in  coast  defense 21 

513  (3) 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/fortificationsOOunitrich 


FORTIFICATIONS. 


I.   INTRODUCTION. 

In  a  memorandum  from  the  Chief  of  Staff  dated  November  15, 
1915,  dh^ections  were  given  for  the  preparation  of  a  brochure  upon 
the  subject  of  "  Fortifications,''  with  sole  reference  to  the  present 
European  war,  giving  especial  attention  to  the  following  points: 

(a)  "What  influence  forts  and  fortified  cities,  as  distinguished  from 
intrenched  areas,  have  exerted  on  the  operations  on  land. 

(h)  Influence  of  seacoast  fortifications  with  particular  reference 
to  the  attack  of  the  allied  fleet  against  the  fortifications  of  the  Dar- 
danelles. Give  in  detail  the  total  armament,  with  calibers  of  arms  of 
the  fleet  as  well  as  of  the  land  forts,  and  the  losses  in  personnel  and 
material  suffered  by  both  fleets  and  forts. 

(c)  A  brief  summary  of  the  attempt  to  take  these  forts  by  the 
operation  of  the  mobile  troops ;  the  number  of  mobile  troops,  as  near 
as  can  be  determined,  used  to  date,  both  in  the  attack  and  in  the 
defense,  with  total  losses. 

This  has  been  done  as  far  as  practicable  with  the  data  now  avail- 
able, and  the  results  are  noted  in  the  following  paragraphs : 

1.  INFLUENCE  OF  FORTS  AND  FORTIFIED  CITIES,  AS  DISTIN- 
GUISHED FROM  INTRENCHED  AREAS,  UPON  OPERATIONS  ON 
LAND. 

FORTIFICATIONS  OF  LIEGE. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  European  war  the  Germans,  in 
their  march  through  Belgium,  were,  on  the  evening  of  August  4, 
1914,  closing  in  on  Liege,  which  lies  astride  the  Meuse  Eiver  near 
the  eastern  boundary  of  Belgium.  The  fortifications  of  Liege  had 
been  constructed  by  Brialment,  a  Belgian  officer,  who  also  designed 
the  fortifications  of  Namur  and  Antwerp.  They  were  completed  in 
1892,  and  consisted  of  a  circle  of  forts  commanding  the  main  ap- 
proaches to  the  city  and  about  4  miles  therefrom.  There  were  six 
main  forts  of  the  pentagonal  type  and  six  smaller,  triangular  in 
shape;  the  greatest  distance  between  forts  was  7,000  yards,  and  the 
average  less  than  4,000  yards.  Each  fort  had  a  garrison  of  about  80 
men  and  an  armament  of  two  6-inch  guns,  four  4.T-inch  guns,  two 
8-inch  mortars,  and  three  or  four  quick-fire  guns,  the  total  number 
of  guns  in  the  12  forts  being  about  400.    It  was  intended  to  construct 

513 

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6 

between  the  forts  lines  of  trenches  and  redoubts  for  infantry  and 
gun  pits  for  artillery,  but  this  had  not  been  done. 

The  fort  itself  consisted  of  a  low  mound  of  concrete  or  masonry, 
roofed  with  concrete  and  covered  with  earth;  a  deep  ditch  sur- 
rounded the  mound,  the  top  of  the  latter  barely  showing  above  the 
margin  of  the  ditch.  The  top  was  pierced  with  circular  pits,  in 
which  "  cupolas  "  or  gun  turrets  moved  up  and  down.  Within  the 
mound  there  were  quarters,  machinery,  stores,  etc. 

Wlien  the  Germans  appeared  the  Belgian  mobilization  was  still  in 
progress,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  garrison,  instead  of  being  30,000 
as  was  intended,  was  only  20,000.  The  Germans,  numbering  about 
30,000,  concentrated  the  attack 'on  the  four  forts  at  the  southeast 
sector  and  opened  up  with  field  gims  on  the  night  of  August  4-5. 
One  of  the  forts  was  silenced  by  this  fire  on  the  5th,  and  on  the  6th 
the  Germans  brought  up  their  8.4-inch  howitzers  and  probably  some 
11-inch  mortars,  outranging  the  Belgian  guns.  Shells  are  said  to 
have  gone  through  12  feet  of  concrete.  The  accurate  firing  of  the 
Germans  showed  that  the  forts  could  not  long  withstand,  and  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  6th  the  Belgian  field  force  was  withdrawn  from  the 
city  and  all  the  forts  abandoned  except  the  northern  ones.  The  Ger- 
mans left  the  remaining  forts  in  peace  until  the  13th,  when  the 
11-inch  mortars  opened  on  them,  and  by  the  15th  all  had  been  cap- 
tured. The  cupolas  had  been  smashed  and  shells  had  penetrated  the 
roofs  and  exploded  the  magazines. 

FORTIFICATIONS  OF  NAMUR  AND  ALONG  THE  FRENCH  FRONTIER. 

Namur  was  defended  by  a  ring  of  nine  forts,  2J  miles  from  the 
city,  with  an  armament  similar  to  that  in  the  Liege  forts.  The 
garrison  of  26,000  had  prepared  the  defense  of  the  intervals  by  in- 
trenchments  and  wire  entanglements,  and  a  vigorous  defense  was 
intended,  as  French  help  was  expected.  The  Germans  brought  up 
32  modern  siege  pieces,  including  the  42-centimeter  howitzer,  its 
first  appearance,  and  the  Austrian  12-inch  mortar,  and  placed  them 
3  miles  from  the  Belgian  lines.  The  attack  began  August  20.  On 
the  next  day  the  Belgians  had  to  withdraw  from  the  advanced 
trenches  owing  to  their  inability  to  reply  to  the  German  fire;  two 
forts  fell;  three  others  were  silenced  after  an  attack  of  two  hours. 
On  the  23d  Namur  was  occupied,  and  on  the  25th  the  last  fort  had 
fallen.  One  fort  had  fired  only  10  times  and  was  itself  struck  by 
1,200  shells  fired  at  the  rate  of  20  per  minute.  The  speedy  fall  of 
Namur  came  near  playing  havoc  with  the  allies'  plans,  as  with  the 
delay  caused  by  its  resistance  they  had  intended  to  complete  the 
concentration  along  the  Belgian  frontier. 

513 


Other  fortified  places,  such  as  Lille,  Laon,  La  Fere,  and  Rheims, 
along  the  northeastern  French  boundary  fell  before  the  advancing 
Germans  without  striking  a  blow.  The  advance  was  on  such  a  broad 
front  that  an  attempt  at  defense  would  have  endangered  the  safety 
of  the  garrisons,  and  it  was  imperative  that  the  garrisons  join  the 
field  army.  By  August  28  Mauberge  of  all  the  northern  strong- 
holds alone  held  out.  The  defenses  had  been  brought  to  a  high 
state  of  efficiency,  the  intervals  well  prepared  with  an  armored  train 
running  on  a  track  encircling  the  main  line  of  defenses.  The  German 
infantry  invested  the  place  August  27,  but  the  siege  guns  did  not 
go  into  action  until  September  3.  The  place  fell  September  8  with 
a  loss  of  40,000  men. 

ANTWERP. 

Antwerp,  said  to  be  the  second  most  strongly  fortified  city  of 
Europe,  encircled  by  a  girdle  of  20  permanent  forts  and  12  earthen 
redoubts,  was  in  similar  manner  quickly  reduced  by  the  heavy  siege 
guns.  The  garrison,  beginning  to  profit  by  the  lessons  learned  at 
Liege  and  Namur,  attempted  to  keep  the  enemy's  big  howitzers 
beyond  range  of  the  forts,  but  were  driven  back  by  the  superior 
numbers  of  the  Germans,  whose  siege  guns  were  then  brought  up 
and  quickly  demolished  the  masonry  forts.  Thus  the  garrisoix 
was  deprived  of  any  further  assistance  from  its  larger  guns  and, 
being  but  poorly  entrenched  and  unable  to  withstand  the  overwhelm- 
ing artillery  fire,  was  forced  back  to  the  inner  line,  thereby  per- 
mitting the  siege  gims  to  come  within  range  of  the  city,  which  had 
therefore  to  be  abandoned  promptly  in  order  to  prevent  its  destruc- 
tion by  bombardment. 

VERDUN. 

Verdun,  however,  on  the  eastern  French  frontier,  with  a  ring  of 
forts  5  miles  from  the  city,  is  still  in  the  hands  of  the  French, 
because  with  a  field  army  employing  earthworks  the  fortified  zone 
has  been  largely  extended  and  the  German  howitzers  have  been  kept 
6  miles  from  the  forts.  The  unfortified  city  of  Nancy  has  withstood 
several  heavy  attacks,  being  protected  by  a  field  army  on  the  hills 
forming  the  "  Grand  Crown." 

PRZEMYSL  AND  THE  RUSSIAN   FORTIFICATIONS. 

The  Russians  invested  the  fortress  of  Przemysl  on  September  22, 
1914,  but  later  the  siege  was  raised  and  on  November  12  it  was 
invested  a  second  time.  As  the  Russians  had  no  heavy  siege  guns,  the 
siege  resulted  in  an  attempt  to  starve  out  the  garrison,  which  suc- 

513 


8 

ceeded  March  22,  1915.  With  the  return  of  the  Teutonic  allies  in 
May,  20  days  was  sufficient  to  recapture  the  place.  The  Eussians 
stated  that  their  ammunition  supply  was  low,  but  it  is  safe  to 
assume  that  the  presence  of  the  heavy  siege  guns  with  the  Germans 
had  a  great  deal  to  do  with  the  recapture. 

The  fortresses  guarding  Warsaw  and  the  Russian  frontier  on  the 
west  were  quickly  taken  during  the  advance  of  the  Teutonic  allies 
in  the  summer  of  1915,  either  by  maneuvering  the  defenders  out  of 
them  or  by  bringing  up  the  heavy  guns  and  shattering  the  fortifi- 
cations, as  at  Novo  Georgievsk.  The  fortress  of  Ossowetz  on  the  line 
Niemen-Bobr-Narew  had  a  different  history.  In  February,  1915, 
the  Russians  fell  back  across  the  Bobr  River  to  the  protection  of 
Ossowetz,  which  stood  on  the  east  bank  along  a  long  ridge  covered 
with  woods,  affording  good  artillery  jDositions,  and  commanding  the 
opposite  bank,  where  artillery  positions  were  poor.  There  were  ex- 
tensive marshes  along  the  river,  but  at  this  time  of  the  year  they 
were  frozen.  The  Germans  at  first  tried  to  turn  the  position,  but 
failing,  brought  up  their  heavy  mortars,  eyen  the  42-centimeter 
howitzer.  The  Russian  batteries  were  so  well  concealed  that  the 
Germans  could  not  locate  them  and  their  big  guns  did  no  damage. 
The  Russians  silenced  several  batteries  without  suffering  from  their 
fire.  As  the  warm  weather  advanced,  the  marshes  made  it  difficult 
to  emplace  the  heavy  gims.  Ossowetz  did  not  fall  until  August  22 
in  the  general  Russian  retreat  after  the  capture  of  Warsaw. 

THE   FORTIFIED    CITY   OF   THE   FUTURE. 

The  failure  of  the  forts  in  the  present  war  is  due  to  several  causes : 

First.  Being  built  some  years  before  the  war,  their  position  was 
accurately  known  to  the  enemy,  thus  losing  the  advantage  of  conceal- 
ment ;  also,  the  details  of  their  construction  leaked  out  and  guns  .were 
especially  designed  to  destroy  them. 

Second.  Their  armament  had  not  been  kept  up  to  date  and  was 
entirely  overpowered  by  gims  of  recent  construction  and  of  a  type 
unknown  to  the  defense. 

Third.  The  garrisons  permitted  the  enemy  to  emplace  his  guns 
within  their  effective  range,  but  beyond  range  of  the  forts'  guns. 

The  favorable  effect  of  concealment,  as  a  defensive  measure,  is 
illustrated  by  the  operations  against  Ossowetz,  and  that  of  keeping 
the  enemy  at  a  distance  by  the  operations  against  Verdun. 

The  experiences  of  this  war  confirm  the  conclusion  reached  during 
the  siege  of  Port  Arthur  in  1904, ''  that  the  mounting  of  large-caliber 
guns  in  a  fort  for  use  against  the  siege  guns  of  the  enemy  is  a  fatal 
518 


error."  It  would  therefore  seem  preferable  to  place  the  fixed  heavy 
guns  in  emplacements  located  in  rear  of  the  line  of  forts,  depending 
for  protection  upon  concealment  rather  than  masonry  or  other  cover. 
The  forts  themselves,  whether  permanent  or  improvised  after  the 
outbreak  of  war,  should  be  designed  for  an  infantry  garrison  only, 
and  the  main  line  of  defense  should  consist  of  a  continuous  system  of 
infantry  entrenchments  (including  machine-gun  emplacements),  lo- 
cated in  advance  of  the  line  of  forts.  These  latter  would  serve  mainly 
as  supporting  points  for  organizing  a  counter  attack  in  case  the 
front  were  penetrated. 

To  check  the  enemy's  advance  before  his  heaviest  guns  have 
reached  points  within  effective  range  of  the  city,  naval  base,  or  other 
vital  object  to  be  protected,  a  garrison  sufficiently  strong  to  operate 
well  in  advance  of  the  forts,  is  indispensable,  and  its  action  should  be 
assisted  by  long-range  fire  from  the  fixed  armament,  which  should 
be  superior  in  caliber  and  range  to  the  guns  usually  supplied  to  an 
army  in  the  field. 

The  guns  of  the  fortress,  both  fixed  and  mobile,  should  be  dis- 
tributed over  a  large  area  and  advantage  taken  of  the  terrain  to 
secure  concealment,  which  must  be  had  at  any  price.  It  is  important 
to  bear  in  mind  that  the  number  of  guns  permanently  emplaced 
should  be  comparatively  small  compared  with  the  total  heavy  arma- 
ment of  the  fortress,  or,  in  other  words,  the  main  reliance  will  be 
placed  on  the  mobile  guns,  some  of  which  should  be  at  least  as  pow- 
erful as  any  the  enemy  can  bring  against  them. 

The  fortress  of  the  future  should  consist  of  a  large  area  so 
organized  as  to  insure  extreme  mobility  both  to  troops  and  guns. 
There  will  be  no  conspicuous  forts  of  masonry  and  armor.  Per- 
manent gun  emplacements  should  be  constructed  only  at  important 
points  with  the  primary  intention  of  compelling  the  enemy  to  lose 
time  in  bringing  up  his  heaviest  siege  guns.  The  mobile  guns  would 
be  located  in  earthen  emplacements  well  concealed  from  the  enemy's 
observers  who  might  endeavor  to  direct  fire  on  them.  The  point 
to  be  emphasized  is  that  unless  the  garrison  be  strong  enough  in  both 
mobile  troops  and  mobile  guns  to  keep  the  enemy  from  breaking 
through  the  line  or  coming  within  effective  range  of  the  city  proper 
or  other  vital  point  or  object  to  be  protected,  then  there  is  no  hope 
of  offering  a  prolonged  resistance. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  it  is  apparent  that  intrenched  areas  with 
mobile  troops  and  guns  are  a  more  dependable  protection  than  a 
stereotyped  system  of  permanent  forts. 

30669°— No.  513—16 2 


10 

2.  INFLUENCE  OF  SEACOAST  FORTIFICATIONS,  WITH  PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE  TO  THE  ATTACK  BY  ALLIED  FLEET  ON  DARDA- 
NELLES FORTIFICATIONS. 

DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  DARDANELLES. 

The  western  approach  to  the  city  of  Constantinople  from  the 
Aegean  Sea  is  through  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 
The  Dardanelles  (ancient  Hellespont)  is  a  long  winding  channel,  47 
miles  in  length,  but  the  really  narrow  portion,  extending  from  the 
Aegean  Sea  to  the  town  of  Gallipoli,  represents  a  sea  passage  of 
about  33  miles.  The  passage  is  at  no  point  wider  than  7,000  yards, 
and  at  one  point,  the  Narrows,  14  miles  from  the  entrance,  it  con- 
tracts to  1,400  yards.  The  surface  current  flows  westward  into  the 
Aegean  at  an  average  speed  of  IJ  knots,  which  is  sometimes  trebled 
in  the  Narrows  after  strong  northerly  winds.  The  depth  in  mid- 
channel  varies  from  25  to  55  fathoms,  and  there  are  shallows  at 
some  of  the  bays  in  the  wider  sections.  Owing  to  the  narrowness, 
the  strong  current,  and  the  cross  currents  set  up  at  some  of  the 
bays,  maneuvering  of  large  vessels  is  difficult.  The  weather  is 
treacherous  and  uncertain;  the  prevailing  winds  for  nine  months 
of  the  year  are  northeasterly,  but  south  winds  spring  up  quickly, 
and  blows  last  from  three  to  five  days.  Unfavorable  weather  and 
frequent  haze  and  mist  were  encountered  during  the  earlier  stages 
of  the  naval  operations. 

The  long  narrow  tongue  of  land  to  the  north  is  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula.  It  has  its  greatest  width,  12  miles,  just  above  the  Nar- 
rows or  opposite  Suvla  Bay;  it  is  narrowest  at  Bulair,  3  miles;  at 
the  Narrows  the  width  is  5  miles.  Ships  can  therefore  lie  in  the 
Gulf  of  Saros  and  fire  across  the  peninsula.  The  Asiatic  shore  of 
the  Dardanelles  is  lower  than  the  European.  The  hills  are  low 
and  wooded,  while  on  the  peninsula  they  are  bare  and  rocky  cliffs. 
On  both  shores  there  are  heights  which  give  advantage  to  defensive 
artillery  and  at  the  Narrows  both  shores  tower  above  the  ships. 

FORTIFICATIONS    OF    THE    DARDANELLES. 

The  original  fortifications  were  the  "Dardanelles  Castles";  the 
two  inner,  the  "  Old  Castles,"  at  the  Narrows,  were  built  by  the 
Sultan  Mohammed  II,  the  conqueror  of  Constantinople,  in  1462 ; 
the  two  at  the  entrance,  the  "  New  Castles,"  were  built  in  1659.  At 
the  instigation  of  Great  Britain  new  fortifications  were  built  in  the 
Narrows  between  1864  and  1877.  After  the  peace  of  San  Stefano  in 
1878  the  Germans  designed  new  fortifications  and  all  the  new  fortifi- 
cations were  armed  with  Krupp  guns. 

513 


11 

From  the  best  obtainable  information,  in  the  spring  of  1915  the 
armament  was  as  follows:  At  the  entrance  between  the  towns  of 
Seddel-Bahr  near  Cape  Helles  on  the  Europeon  side,  and  Kum  Kale 
on  the  Asiatic  side,  there  were  four  forts  or  batteries,  two  on  each 
side,  with  an  armament  of  ten  10.2-inch  guns,  four  9.2-inch  guns,  and 
two  6-inch  guns. 

Proceeding  towards  the  Narrows,  there  were  on  the  Asiatic  side 
fortifications  on  Dardanes  Hill,  4  miles  south  of  the  Narrows,  and 
two  forts  at  the  Narrows  near  the  town  of  Chanak — the  whole 
mounting  an  armament  of  four  14-inch  guns,  six  10.2-inch  guns,  one 
8.3-inch  howitzer,  and  nine  6-inch  guns.  On  the  European  side  there 
were  three  batteries  south  of  the  town  of  Kilid  Bahr  at  the  Narrows, 
and  a  number  of  batteries  on  the  hills  around  Kilid  Bahr,  the  total 
armament  being  four  14-inch  guns,  one  11-inch  gun,  eight  10.2-inch 
guns,  fourteen  9.2-inch  guns,  fifteen  8.3-inch  howitzers,  and  twenty- 
four  6-inch  guns.  The  armament  between  the  entrance  and  the  Nar- 
rows thus  amounted  to  eight  14-inch  guns,  one  11-inch  gun,  fourteen 
10.2-inch  guns,  fourteen  9.2-inch  guns,  fourteen  8.3-inch  howitzers, 
and  thirty-three  6-inch  guns. 

The  fortifications  extended  4  miles  farther  north  to  the  line 
through  Nagara,  beyond  which  the  Dardanelles  turns  to  the  north- 
east and  broadens  out.  The  armament  on  both  sides  amounted  to 
two  14-inch  guns,  five  10.2-inch  guns,  five  9.2-inch  guns,  eight  8.3- 
inch  howitzers,  and  fifteen  6-inch  guns,  all  except  six  6-inch  guns 
being  on  the  Asiatic  side. 

In  addition  to  the  above  there  were  smaller  guns  to  protect  mine 
fields. 

From  an  examination  of  the  chart,  it  seems  that  a  hostile  fleet, 
after  silencing  the  guns  at  the  entrance  and  proceeding  towards  the 
Narrows,  would  be  subject  to  the  fire  of  the  following  guns  when  it 
had  reached  a  point  4  miles  from  the  Narrows:  ten  14-inch  guns, 
eighteen  10.2-inch  guns,  eight  9.2-inch  guns,  twenty-one  8.3-inch 
howitzers,  and  thirty-seven  6-inch  guns. 

(a)  Power  of  the  guns: 

The  guns  in  the  batteries  vary  greatly ;  alongside  old  guns  are  guns 
of  very  great  power.  The  heaviest  gun,  of  which  there  were  10,  the 
14-inch  Krupp,  with  a  projectile  weighing  1,365  pounds,  appears 
superior  to  our  14-rnch  seacoast  gun  with  its  1,600-pound  projectile, 
as  it  has  a  reported  penetration  in  Krupp  hardened  steel  armor  at 
8,000  meters  of  20  inches,  while  our  gun  has  16.3  inches.  Its  life, 
however,  is  limited  to  80  or  90  rounds,  and  hence  it  is  probably  not 
as  accurate  as  ours  after  firing  a  number  of  shots. 

The  next  heaviest  gun  is  the  11-inch,  but  there  was  only  one  of 
that  caliber.     Then  comes  the  10.2-inch,  of  w^hich  there  were  29,  a 

513 


12 

gun  manufactured  some  years  ago  by  the  Krupps.  It  is  not  as  power- 
ful as  our  10-inch  gun;  its  projectile  weighs  450  pounds,  as  against 
our  575  pounds,  and  its  penetration  at  3,000  meters  is  6  inches,  while 
our  gun  penetrates  9.3  inches  at  8,000  meters.  The  other  heavy- 
caliber  gun  is  9.2  inches,  of  which  there  were  25,  with  a  projectile 
weighing  420  pounds,  and  still  more  inferior  to  our  10-inch  gun. 

It  is  believed  that  Krupp  guns  of  later  pattern  were  mounted  after 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  1914,  and  it  seems  to  be  certain  that 
heavy  mobile  howitzers  or  mortars  were  used  against  the  allies. 

(h)   Character  of  the  batteries: 

The  batteries  were  built  with  great  care,  but  groups  were  formed 
of  different  calibers  and  types,  which  rendered  serving  them  difficult 
and  slow  in  action.  The  emplacements  are  of  concrete  and  steel 
with  earthen  cover,  with  guns  in  embrasures  rather  than  in  turrets. 
There  was  a  mo'dern  system  of  seai'chlights,  telephones,  and  range 
finders,  and  good  communication  by  roads.  They  were  generally 
invisible  from  the  sea,  but  their  positions  were  detected  by  the  stone 
barracks,  which  were  usually  close  behind  them  and  in  full  view  of 
passing  ships. 

One  of  the  batteries  was  mamied  entirely  by  Germans,  but  the 
others  had  Turkish  crews  that  had  been  drilled  by  German-  officers. 
The  movable  howitzer  batteries  appeared-  to  have  had  German  coast 
artillerymen  with  German  naval  officers  in  command. 

REDUCTION  OF  THE  FORTS  AT  THE  ENTRANCE. 

On  November  3,  1914,  the  allied  fleet  bombarded  the  forts  at  the 
entrance,  but  the  real  operations  began  February  19,  1915,  with  a 
fleet  of  British  battleships  and  cruisers,  aided  by  a  strong  French 
squadron.  The  attack  was  at  first  at  long  range,  to  which  the  forts 
could  not  reply,  being  outranged.  In  the  afternoon  the  ships  closed 
in  and  opened  fire  with  the  secondary  batteries;  the  forts  returned 
the  fire.  The  forts  on  the  European  side  were  apparently  silenced ; 
one  on  the  Asiatic  side  continued  firing.  The  damage  was  subse- 
quently found  to  be  comparatively  small  and  many  of  the  guns  were 
still  intact.  Eight  battleships  were  engaged  with  a  total  of  46  guns  of 
major  caliber,  30  being  12-inch,  and  58  gims  of  minor  caliber  from 
7.5-inch  to  4-inch.  The  shore  guns  were  ten  10.2-inch,  six  9.2-inch, 
and  two  6-inch.  No  ship  was  hit.  In  general  the  guns  Avere  mounted 
in  open  works  near  the  old  masonry  castles,  with  the  sea  faces  pro- 
tected by  earth. 

Action  against  these  forts  continued  until  February  25,  when  the 
reduction  of  all  four  was  completed.  In  the  meantime  the  new  bat- 
tleship, the  Queen  Elizabeth^  with  eight  15-inch  guns  and  twelve 
6-inch  guns,  had  arrived,  giving  the  allies  16  armored  ships  of 


13 

the  line,  12  British  and  4  French.  The  British  casualties  had  been 
three  killed  and  five  wounded.  Landing  parties  had  been  sent 
ashore  as  quickly  as  possible  to  complete  the  work  of  destruction, 
but  were  driven  back  by  the  Turks  before  completing  the  job.  It 
was  reported  by  the  British  that  all  forts  were  completely  demolished 
with  the  exception  of  one  at  Kum  Kale. 

OPERATIONS   AGAINST   THE   FORTS   AT   THE    NARROWS. 

Sweeping  operations  to  clear  the  channel  of  mines  and  obstructions 
began  February  25,  and  on  March  1  three  ships  entered  the  strait 
and  attacked  Fort  Dardanes  with  its  five  6-inch  guns  in  rectangular 
turrets  on  the  military  crest  of  a  hill  350  feet  high ;  these  were  said 
to  be  the  only  Turkish  guns  with  telescopic  sights.  Sweeping  opera- 
tions and  the  attack  on  Fort  Dardanes  with  its  outlying  smaller  bat- 
teries continued  until  March  5,  the  French  division  and  the  Queen 
Elizaheth  using  indirect  fire  from  the  Gulf  of  Saros  on  the  forts  at 
Kilid  Bahr  at  the  Narrows.  An  aeroplane  ship  with  sea  planes  and 
aeroplanes  accompanied  the  fleet.  But  not  a  shot  hit  the  forts  dur- 
ing the  indirect  bombardment;  according  to  the  Turks,  the  aero- 
planes did  not  remain  long  enough  in  the  air  to  direct  the  fire.  On 
March  8  the  Queen  Elizabeth  entered  the  strait  and  fired  on  Kilid 
Bahr  at  21,000  yards  range.  This  long-range  bombardment  of  the 
forts  at  the  Narrows  and  closer  action  by  the  other  ships  against  the 
batteries  south  of  the  Narrows,  together  Avith  mine  sweeping,  con- 
tinued until  March  18.  The  ships  were  hit  several  times,  including 
the  Queen  Elizabeth^  w^hich  was  struck  by  field  guns,  but  no  material 
damage  was  done  and  the  casualties  were  slight.  Fort  Dardanes  and 
other  concealed  batteries  near  by  were  almost  daily  under  the  fire  of 
from  four  or  five  ships,  sixteen  12-inch  guns  and  forty-eight  6-inch 
guns  being  used  against  five  6-inch  guns.  No  battery  on  the  Turkish 
side  was  put  permanently  out  of  action.  The  Turkish  casualties, 
omitting  those  in  the  forts  at  the  entrance,  which  were  heavy,  were 
23  killed  and  10  wounded. 

FINAL  ATTACK  OF  MARCH  18. 

On  March  18  there  was  a  general  attack  on  the  Narrows,  partici- 
pated in  by  12  British  and  4  French  ships,  mounting  a  total  of  82 
major  caliber  guns  from  15-inch  to  9.2-inch,  and  178  minor  caliber 
guns  from  7.5-inch  to  4-inch.  As  stated  in  paragraph  2,  subpara- 
graph 2,  "  Fortifications  of  the  Dardanelles,"  pages  4  and  5,  the 
number  of  guns  that  the  Turks  could  bring  into  action  against  this 
fleet  was  36  major  caliber  direct-fire  guns  and  21  howitzers,  a  total 
of  57,  and  37  minor  caliber  guns.     In  addition  there  were  fieldpieces 

513 


14 

and  movable  heavy  howitzers,  the  number  being  indeterminate.  In 
the  forenoon  the  Qu^en  Elizabeth^  just  inside  the  entrance,  10^  miles 
from  the  Narrows,  and  three  older  British  ships  bombarded  the  forts 
at  the  Narrows,  while  two  other  British  ships  at  closer  range  at- 
tacked Dardanes  and  the  batteries  south  of  the  Narrows.  Shortly- 
after  noon  the  French  division  of  four  ships  advanced  to  the  sup- 
port of  these  two  ships,  taking  up  a  position  near  Kephez  Point,  3 
miles  south  of  the  Narrows.*  A  heavy  fire  was  now  returned  by  the 
forts,  but  as  the  ships  were  maneuvering  in  circles,  few  hits  were 
made.  The  10  ships  that  were  engaged  at  this  time  mounted  58 
major  caliber  guns.  At  1.25  p.  mt  the  forts  ceased  firing.  A  fresh 
British  squadron  of  six  ships  now  arrived  to  relieve  a  correspond- 
ing number  of  ships  well  within  the  strait.  As  this  squadron  neared 
Kephez  Point,  the  other  ships  turned  to  withdraw  when  the  French 
ship,  Bouvet^  was  struck  several  times  and  blew  up,  the  cause  of  the 
explosion  probably  being  a  drifting  mine.  The  new  squadron  con- 
tinued the  advance,  attacking  in  line;  the  ships  just  within  the  en- 
trance continued  the  bombardment,  but  it  was  manifest  that  the 
forts  had  not  been  silenced.  Mine  sweeping  operations  continued, 
but  drifting  mines  sunk  the  British  ships  Irresistible  and  Ocean^ 
and  a  mine  and  gunfire  so  badly  damaged  the  Irvfiexible  that  it  with 
difficulty  reached  the  harbor  of  Mudros,  40  miles  away.  The  French 
ship  Gaulois  was  also  badly  damaged  by  gunfire.  The  attack  ceased 
when  darkness  fell. 

The  attack  had  been  badly  repulsed  and  was  not  again  renewed. 
The  British  casualties  were  slight,  61  all  told,  practically  all  the 
crew  from  the  Irresistible  and  Ocean  being  saved;  but  the  French 
lost  nearly  the  entire  crew  of  the  Bouvet,  The  Turks  lost  23  killed 
and  60  wounded.  The  6-inch  guns  in  the  turrets  at  Dardanes,  which 
had  received  such  a  heavy  fire,  were  not  damaged;  the  turrets  were 
hit  only  three  times.  On  the  European  side  three  10-inch  guns  were 
put  out  of  action,  but  three  weeks  later  all  were  ready  again.  The 
stone  barracks  in  rear  of  the  batteries  were  destroyed;  86  shells 
fell  in  a  space  300  feet  deep  in  rear  of  one  battery,  but  the  battery 
was  untouched.  The  shells  easily  penetrated  earth,  but  not  one 
passed  through  sand  parapets.  After  March  18,  the  Turks  substi- 
tuted sand  for  earth  to  a  large  degree  in  the  parapets  and  divided 
up  the  large  interior  rooms  of  the  batteries  into  smaller  ones  by 
hollow  walls  filled  with  sand. 

EFFICIENCY  OF  SEACOAST  FORTIFICATIONS. 

The  operations  in  the  Dardanelles  have  been  the  only  instance  in 
this  war  of  a  naval  attack  on  seacoast  fortifications,  except  the  minor 
attack  of  the  Japanese  Navy  against  the  Grerman  fortifications  at 
Tsingtau.     Elsewhere,  by  virtue  of  their  existence,  they  have  per- 


15 

formed  their  functions  of  protecting  harbors,  fleets,  and  naval  bases. 
The  German  fleet,  under  the  protection  of  the  shore  guns,  has  main- 
tained its  existence  in  spite  of  the  proximity  of  the  superior  British 
fleet. 

These  operations  have  emphasized  the  fact  that  has  been  thor- 
oughly demonstrated  by  history  that  a  purely  naval  attack  can  not 
succeed  against  seacoast  fortifications  adequately  armed  and  manned, 
and  that  in  such  actions  the  proper  function  of  the  navy  is  to  convoy 
the  army,  which  will  make  the  attack  by  land,  and  to  protect  its  line 
of  communications. 

REQUISITES  FOR  SUCCESSFUL  DEFENSE. 

The  forts  at  the  entrance  fell  and  those  in  the  Narrows  were 
scarcely  damaged,  though  in  both  cases  there  was  an  overwhelming 
fire  from  the  ships.  The  difference  in  the  two  cases  is  this:  At  the 
entrance  the  guns  were  outranged  and  the  ships  had  plenty  of  sea 
room  in  which  to  maneuver  and  bring  the  heavy  guns  to  bear,  free 
from  danger  of  mines ;  in  the  narrow  mined  channel  of  the  Narrows, 
with  both  shores  lined  with  guns,  some  of  them  equal  or  nearly  so 
to  the  heaviest  ship  gun,  the  ships  had  to  come  within  range  and 
could  attack  with  only  a  portion  of  the  force.  In  such  a  position,  a 
fleet,  exposed  to  fixed  and  floating  mines,  shore  torpedoes  and  sub- 
marines, will  fail.  The  slight  damage  sustained  by  the  shore  bat- 
teries is  illustrated  by  Fort  Dardanes,  which  withstood  the  fire  from 
the  British  ships,  admittedly  inferior  to  none  in  marksmanship. 
An  interior  city,  with  its  approach  channel  protected  with  well- 
placed  and  concealed  guns,  equal  in  range  to  the  enemy's,  and  pro- 
vided with  the  accessory  means  of  defense,  need  not  fear  capture  by 
bombardment  or  a  run  by  the  forts.  A  fort  on  the  seacoast  proper, 
exposed  to  the  fire  from  ships  at  sea,  must  have  guns  of  greater  range 
than  the  ships'  guns;  otherwise  the  ships  could  silence  the  gims  on 
shore  at  their  pleasure,  and  under  their  fire  could  land  troops  to 
complete  the  destruction  of  the  forts. 

Concealment  and  dispersion  are  also  necessary.  The  aeroplane 
observation  of  fire  by  the  allies  does  not  seem  to  have  been  very  effi- 
cient, but  this  can  not  always  be  relied  on,  and  concealment  from 
aerial  observation  should  be  obtained.  Without  such  observation, 
long-range  indirect  bombardment  is  worthless.  By  taking  advantage 
of  the  terrain  and  resorting  to  dispersion,  the  amount  of  concrete 
might  be  reduced,  and  the  money  thus  saved  put  into  more  guns. 

NECESSITY    FOR    MOBILE    TROOPS. 

The  power  of  coast  fortifications,  to  repel  a  direct  attack  by  an 
enemy  fleet,  is  limited  to  the  area  within  range  of  their  guns,  but 
their  influence  is  extended  considerably  further  whenever  they  cover 


16 

a  base  from  which  submarines  operate.  These  fortifications  must 
therefore  be  recognized  as  of  supreme  importance  within  the  scope 
of  their  proper  functions,  and  this  is  especially  true  of  a  country 
possessing  an  enormous  frontage  on  two  oceans.  Their  paramount 
value  is  that  they  relieve  the  navy  of  the  local  defense  of  important 
harbors  or  other  strategic  points  and  thus  release  our  seagoing  fleet 
for  operations  against  the  enemy  on  the  high  seas,  and  furnish  a 
refuge  for  it  in  the  face  of  overpowering  odds.  But  beyond  the 
sphere  of  influence  of  our  seacoast  forts,  enemy  ships  may  approach 
the  shore  with  impunity  and,  under  the  cover  of  their  gvms,  may 
land  troops  that  can  then  proceed  against  the  important  places  de- 
fended by  the  forts  or  even  against  the  forts  themselves,  since  they 
are  vulnerable  from  the  land  side.  With  our  long  coast  lines,  the 
guarding  of  every  possible  landing  place  by  seacoast  fortifications 
is  out  of  the  question,  and,  although  the  development  and  employ- 
ment of  heavy  mobile  seacoast  armament  along  our  coastal  railroads 
will  further  restrict  the  landing  places  open  to  an  enemy,  there  will 
still  remain  many  places  affording  facilities  for  landing  operations 
which  can  only  be  opposed  by  mobile  troops  acting  without  the 
cooperation  of  Coast  Artillery.  For  these  reasons  it  is  evident  that 
there  must  also  be  available  a  mobile  force  properly  trained,  organ- 
ized and  equipped,  to  send  against  the  enemy  at  the  landing  and 
defeat  them  there,  or  at  least  prevent  his  advance  toward  his  objec- 
tive, should  a  landing  be  effected.  Until  we  have  adequately  pro- 
vided for  this  dual  defense  of  our  coasts,  having  full  regard  to  both 
fixed  defenses  and  mobile  troops,  our  Navy  will  never  be  free  to 
perform  its  primary  function,  but  will  be  frittered  away  in  response 
to  clamor  for  protection  from  our  coast  population. 

An  illustration  of  the  value  of  mobile  troops  in  coast  defense  is 
afforded  by  the  operations  at  the  Dardanelles,  described  in  the  last 
subhead  under  paragraph  3,  page  12,  of  this  study. 

3.  SUMMARY   OF   ATTEMPT  TO  TAKE   DARDANELLES   FORTIFICA- 
TIONS BY  MOBILE  TROOPS. 

INITIAL  DELAY. 

Before  the  attack  of  March  18  it  had  been  decided  to  undertake 
operations  by  land  at  the  Dardanelles.  An  official  French  note 
stated  on  the  12th  that  a  force  was  on  its  way  to  the  Levant,  and 
Gen.  lam  Hamilton  was  appointed  commander  of  the  British  force 
and  arrived  in  time  to  witness  the  action  of  the  18th.  Both  the 
French  and  British  forces  had  arrived  in  the  harbor  of  Mudros  on 
the  island  of  Lemnos,  west  of  the  Dardanelles;  but  as  the  British 
transports  had  not  been  loaded  with  a  view  to  make  a  landing  in 
force  on  a  hostile  shore  and  the  lack  of  facilities  in  Mudros  made 
51  s 


17 

redistribution  impossible  there,  they  had  to  be  sent  back  to  Alex- 
andria for  reloading.  A  month  was  lost,  which  it  is  safe  to  say 
was  well  employed  by  the  Turks. 

TERRAIN. 

The  Gallipoli  Peninsula  is  covered  by  hills  which  rise  to  a  height 
of  1,000  feet;  on  the  southern  end  Achi  Baba,  600  feet  high,  domi- 
nates the  end  of  the  peninsula;  just  west  of  the  Narrows,  Kilid 
Bahr,  700  feet  high,  covers  the  forts  from  an  attack  from  the 
Aegean ;  and  northwest  of  the  Narrows,  Sari  Bair  Mountain  reaches 
a  height  of  970  feet.  These  hills  must  be  taken  before  an  advance 
can  be  made  to  the  shores  of  the  Narrows.  The  hills  do  not  run  in 
a  regular  or  well-defined  direction,  and  between  the  hills  there  are 
a  confusing  number  of  valleys.  The  area  is  practically  roadless  and 
most  of  it  covered  with  prickly  scrub.  The  sides  of  the  hills  are 
almost  vertical.  At  the  water's  edge  there  is  generally  a  narrow 
beach  with  a  steep  bank  10  feet  high,  and  then  the  rolling  hills  with 
their  crests  1,000  yards  from  the  beach.  Every  trail  leading  to  the 
beach  was  covered  with  one  or  more  machine  guns  in  screened  pits, 
and  the  roads  were  covered  with  field  guns  in  groups  of  from  three 
to  six. 

STRENGTH    OF    FORCES. 

The  British  force  consisted  of  the  Twenty-ninth  (Eegular)  Divi- 
sion, the  East  Lancashire  (Territorial)  Division,  a-  naval  division 
of  bluejackets  and  marines,  some  Indian  troops,  and  the  Australian 
and  New  Zealand  Corps,  with  20  battalions  of  infantry,  together 
with  artillery  and  engineers.  The  strength  was  approximately 
100,000.  The  territorials  and  colonial  troops  had  been  wintering 
in  Egypt.  The  French  force  was  about  35,000.  The  Turks  were  in 
greater  force  and  better  posted  than  was  expected;  the  number  on 
the  European  side  has  been  giA^en  as  over  150,000.  Besides,  they 
were  supported  by  the  Germans. 


allies'  plan. 


The  coast  being  precipitous,  landing  places  few,  and  trenches  and 
entanglements  being  visible  on  shipboard  at  most  of  them.  Gen. 
Hamilton  decided  to  throw  the  whole  of  his  troops  very  rapidly 
ashore  at  a  number  of  places,  and  selected  five  beaches  at  the  tip 
of  the  peninsula  and  two  on  the  west  coast,  near  Sari  Bair  Mountain, 
as  landing  places.  He  could  thus  advance  up  the  peninsula  or  cross 
it  where  it  was  about  five  miles  wide,  and  obtaining  possession  of  the 
high  hills,  secure  observation  points  whereby  the  navy  could  assist 
in  the  reduction  of  the  forts. 

518 


18 

LANDINGS  AT  SOUTH  END  OF  PENINSULA. 

April  25  was  the  date  of  the  landing.     The  Twenty-ninth  Divi- 
sion, 20,000  men,  was  to  land  at  the  end  of  the  peninsula  at  the  five 
beaches,  the  three  at  the  tip,  near  Sedd-el-Bahr,  being  the  main 
ones.    At  the  other  two  places,  the  landing  was  to  take  place  at 
dawn,  while  at  the  main  places  the  landings  were  to  be  simultaneously 
at  5.30  a.  m.,  after  half  an  hour's  bombardment  by  the  fleet.    The 
landing  parties,  covering  the  advance  of  the  division,  were  placed 
on  naval  vessels  the  previous  day  and  before  dawn  on  the  25th 
were  in  the  small  boats  in  which  they  were  to  be  towed  ashore.    The 
accompanying  squadron  of  four  battleships  and  four  cruisers  began 
the  preliminary  bombardment.     At  S  beach,  in  Morto  Bay,  the 
farthest  to  the  east,  three  companies  (750  men)  made  a  successful 
landing,  with  a  loss  of  50  men,  and  kept  the  position.    On  Y  beach, 
the  westernmost  landing,  two  battalions  (2,000  men)  landed  on  an 
undefended  beach,  but  were  subsequently  attacked  and  driven  to  the 
boats  with  heavy  losses.    On  X  beach,  3  miles  south  of  Y  beach,  1 
battalion   (1,000  men)   made  a  successful  landing,  under  cover  of 
the  fire  of  the  Iiruplcbcahle^  which  stood  close  inshore,  firing  with 
every  possible  gun,  thus  preparing  the  way  for  a  subsequent  force 
of  2,000  men,  which  joined  hands  with  the  force  landing  at  W 
beach,  the  next  to  the  south.    On  W  beach,  1  battalion  (1,000  men) 
landed  on  a  beach  350  yards  long  and  15  to  40  yards  wide,  well 
protected  with  intrenchments  and  entanglements,  the  latter  extend- 
ing under  water.    The  Turks  reserved  their  fire  until  the  first  boat- 
load of  soldiers  grounded,  and  under  this  fire  the  assailants  had  to 
make  their  way  through  the  entanglement.    A  foothold  was  gained 
and,  more  infantry  following,  connection  was  made  with  X  beach. 
At  V  beach,  west  of  Sedd-el-Bahr,  the  site  of  the  seacoast  forts  that 
had  previously  been  reduced  by  the  navy,  a  force  of  about  3,000 
attempted  to  land  on  a  beach  350  yards  long  by  10  yards  wide,  over- 
looked by  a  natural  amphitheater  rising  back  from  the  beach,  with 
concave  slopes.    On  the  very  margin  of  the  beach  ran  a  wire  entangle- 
ment and  up  the  slopes  were  two  other  lines,  the  whole  covered 
with  fire  of  rifles,  machine  guns,  and  pom-poms.    Three  companies 
(750  men),  landing  in  small  boats,  were  almost  annihilated,  the 
survivors  obtaining  shelter  under  the  lee  of  a  low  sandy  bank  4 
feet  high,  at  the  inner  edge  of  the  beach;  the  boat  crews  were  all 
killed.    It  was  intended  to  land  2,000  men  from  a  collier,  the  Clyde^ 
which  was  to  be  run  ashore,  and  lighters  used  to  form  a  gangway 
between  ship  and  shore.    The  attempt  failed;  of  1,000  men  who  left 
the  colliers,  50  per  cent  were  kill  or  wounded.     Nothing  could  be 
done  until  night,  when  the  remainder  of  the  infantry  from  the 
Clyde  went  ashore.    On  the  26th,  under  cover  of  the  fire  from  the 


19 

ships,  the  troops  established  themselves  on  the  crests  of  the  sur- 
rounding hills.  During  the  night  of  the  25th,  the  disembarkation 
of  the  remainder  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Division  was  proceeding  on 
W  and  X  beaches. 

LANDING    BY   THE    AUSTRALIAN-NEW    ZEALAND    CORPS. 

This  corps  of  35,000  men  landed  north  of  Gaba  Tepe,  near  the  foot 
of  Sari  Bair  Mountain.  This  rugged  and  difficult  part  of  the  coast 
was  chosen  because  it  was  believed  it  would  be  undefended.  The 
landing  was  to  be  a  surprise  and  the  preliminary  bombardment  was 
omitted.  The  covering  force  of  4,000  men  in  ships'  boats  was 
towed  by  destroyers  to  within  500  yards  from  the  beach,  which  was 
1,000  yards  long,  when  the  destroj^ers  dropped  behind  and  steam 
launches  towed  the  boats  in.  In  the  darkness  the  boats  were  close 
to  the  shore  before  they  were  discovered.  About  a  battalion  of 
Turks  disputed  the  landing,  but  they  were  driven  back.  The  main 
body  came  up  in  the  transports  and  by  2  p.  m.  12,000  men  and  two 
batteries  of  mountain  artillery  were  ashore.  The  Turks  promptly 
rallied  and  reinforced  to  20,000  by  11  a.  m.,  made  counter  attacks. 
These  counter  attacks  continued  for  several  days,  but  with  the 
assistance  of  the  ships'  fire  the  British  maintained  their  position. 
On  this  first  day — April  25 — 29,000  men  were  landed. 

DIVERSION    BY   THE    FRENCH. 

As  a  diversion  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  Asiatic  guns  from  Sedd-el- 
Bahr,  a  regiment  of  the  French  corps  landed  at  Kum  Kale  on  the 
Asiatic  shore  on  the  25th,  but  on  the  26th  they  reembarkeyd,  after  a 
loss  of  754,  one-fourth  of  its  effective  strength,  and  the  French  corps 
began  landing  at  V  Beach. 

ATTEMPTS    TO    ADVANCE. 

On  April  28  the  allies  held  a  line  across  the  peninsula,  three  miles 
north  of  Sedd-el-Bahr,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  capture  the 
hill  of  Achi  Baba,  which  failed.  The  troops  landing  on  the  west 
coast  also  tried  to  advance,  but  were  held  to  a  semicircle  1,100  yards 
in  dia;neter  from  the  beach.  Here  they  were  holding  open  a  door 
to  the  vital  point  of  the  Turkish  p.osition  and  were  keeping  24,000 
of  the  best  Turkish  troops  out  of  the  main  action  around  Sedd-el- 
Bahr.  By  May  5  the  landing  of  the  allies  was  completed.  The 
British  official  report  gives  the  losses  among  the  British  at  this  time 
as  602  officers  and  13,377  men,  which  is  about  13.5  per  cent  of  the 
total  estimated  force  of  100,000.  It  is  estimated  that  the  Turks  lost 
18,000  in  the  operations  of  April  25-27. 


20 

May  6  a  general  advance  was  attempted  against  the  town  of  Krithia 
and  the  hill  of  Achi  Baba,  but  the  attack  was  unsuccessful.  May  18 
the  Turks,  estimated  at  30,000,  attacked  the  force  at  Anzac  Cove 
(the  name  given  to  the  landing  place  of  the  Australian-New  Zealand 
Corps,  themselves  termed  "  Anzacs"),  and  were  repulsed  with  a  loss 
of  7,000,  the  Anzacs  losing  500.  To  May  31  the  British  losses  were 
38,636  (1,722  being  officers),  the  French  about  5,000,  and  the  Turkish 
estimated  at  60,000.  The  total  battle  losses  of  the  British  in  the  three 
years  of  the  Boer  War  were  38,156.  According  to  a  Turkish  report 
at  this  date  the  number  of  British  and  French  troops  amounted  to 
90,000.    The  Turks  had  received  60,000  reenforcements. 

June  4  there  was  another  general  attack  by  the  allies  from  Sedd- 
el-Bahr ;  on  the  right  there  were  two  French  divisions,  the  rest  of  the 
line,  4,000  yards,  being  held  by  24,000  British  infantry.  The  net 
result  was  a  gain  of  200  to  400  yards  along  a  front  of  three  miles. 
The  line  then  held  extended  from  south  of  Krithia  southeast  across 
the  peninsula,  about  4  miles  from  Sedd-el-Bahr.  The  appearance  of 
German  submarines  caused  the  withdrawal  to  Mudros  Harbor  of  the 
transports  and  the  sending  of  supplies  in  small  boats.  The  Turks 
under  Enver  Pasha  made  a  general  attack  in  the  vicinity  of  Krithia 
Juaie  30-Ju«ly  2,  but  accomplished  little,  with  a  loss  of  5,150  killed 
and  15,000  wounded.  To  July  18,  the  British  losses  were  49,283, 
2,144  being  officers. 

LANDING   AT    SU\XA    BAT   AND    SUBSEQUENT   OPERATIONS. 

August  7  another  landing  was  made  at  Suvla  Bay,  4  miles  north 
of  Anzac  Cove.  The  landing  began  at  2  a.  m.  on  three  beaches  and 
by  day  a  force  of  two  divisions  was  firmly  established.  The  Anzac 
force  joined  in  the  attack,  the  intention  being  to  connect  the  two 
fmxes  and  capture  the  Sari  Bair  Ridge.  The  attack  from  Anzac 
was  carried  to  the  summit  of  the  ridge,  but  as  the  Turks  had  been 
heavily  reenforced,  the  attp.ck  from  Suvla  Bay  did  not  make  the 
expected  progress,  and  the  line  had  to  fall  back.  The  two  forces 
were  finally  joined  on  a  line  12  miles  long.  The  number  of  men  land- 
ing at  Suvla  Bay  is  not  known;  the  British  speak  of  it  as  a  fresh 
army  and  the  Turks  estimated  it  as  70,000.  The  British  losses  were 
heavy ;  according  to  the  Turks,  30,000. 

According  to  a  German  estimate,  on  August  30  the  allies  had  from 
20,000  to  25,000  troops  at  Sedd-el-Bahr,  of  whom  9,000  were  French, 
all  that  was  left  of  the  original  35,000;  9,000  at  Anzac  Cove,  and 
70,000  at  Suvla  Bay.  These  numbers  were  not  materially  increased 
after  that  date,  though  the  losses  in  the  trench  warfare  since  then 
had  brought  the  casualties  on  November  9  to  106,610  among  the 
British.    The  Turkish  losses  are  unknown.    On  December  20  it  was 


21 

announced  that  the  troops  at  Suvla  Bay  and  Anzac  Cove,  about 
100,000,  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  peninsula  for  service  else- 
where; the  troops  at  Sedd-el-Bahr  were  left  there  until  January 
9,  1916,  when  they,  too,  were  withdrawn. 

NECESSITY  FOR  HEAVY  MOBILE  GUNS. 

Although  the  Turks  had  ample  warning  of  the  impending  attack, 
with  an  abundance  of  men  to  draw  upon,  and  had  guarded  the  most 
probable  landing  places  with  intrenchments  and  entanglements,  the 
allies  succeeded  in  getting  ashore.  With  the  limited  number  of 
beaches  suitable  for  landing,  the  Turks  apparently  had  sufficient  force 
to  guard  every  one ;  but  some  were  overlooked  and  the  success  of  the 
allies  is  due  partly  to  that  fact.  The  main  reason  for  the  success, 
though,  is  due  to  the  fire  of  the  covering  ships,  which  could  come  in 
close  enough  to  use  all  their  guns  and  thus  keep  down  the  fire  of  the 
Turks.  If  the  Turks  had  employed  guns  heavy  enough  to  stand  the 
ships  off,  the  landing  would  not  have  taken  place,  for  experience  has 
shown  that  even  the  most  powerful  naval  guns  at  long  range  are  un- 
able to  put  well  concealed  shore  guns  out  of  action.  Even  chance  hits 
have  little  effect  upon  the  sand  or  earthen  parapets. 

It  may  be  accepted  then  as  a  fact,  that  to  prevent  a  hostile  force 
from  landing  there  must  be  in  addition  to  the  usual  infantry  defense 
at  all  the  possible  landings,  guns  of  sufficient  power  to  keep  the  naval 
vessels  at  such  a  distance  that  their  secondary  batteries  can  not  be 
used.  Thus  the  landing  of  troops  or  supplies  from  ships  at  so  great 
a  distance  from  the  shore  can  readily  be  prevented  by  the  infantry 
and  field  guns. 

In  the  case  of  a  landing  on  our  coast,  the  stretch  to  be  covered  is  so 
long  that  it  is  impracticable  to  implace  in  prepared  positions  enough 
of  these  guns  to  cover  all  the  possible  landing  places.  It  will  there- 
fore be  necessary  to  use  mobile  guns  that  can  be  quickly  transported 
to  the  point  threatened.  The  quickest  method  of  transportation 
appears  to  be  a  railroad  paralleling  the  beach,  from  which  spurs 
could  be  run  to  points  near  enough  to  the  front  to  keep  ships  at 
about  8,000  yards  from  the  shore.  The  railroad,  spur  tracks,  and 
gun  locations  should  be  prepared  in  time  of  peace. 

THE  VALUE  OF   MOBILE   TROOPS  IN   COAST  DEFENSE. 

After  the  allies  had  succeeded  in  the  landing  operations  and  had 
assembled  on  the  peninsula  the  entire  expeditionary  force,  their  fur- 
ther advance  was  small,  and  after  maintaining  a  position  near  the 
water's  edge  for  over  nine  months,  the  force  was  withdrawn.  The 
reason  for  the  failure  appears  to  be  threefold :  First,  the  size  of  the 

513 


22 

Turkish  force  was  underestimated  and  an  insufficient  number  of  troops 
was  sent  at  first,  and  these  troops  were  not  sufficiently  reinforced; 
second,  the  terrain  was  favorable  to  the  Truks ;  third,  most  important 
of  all,  the  Turks  had  sufficient  troops  to  prevent  the  allies  from 
advancing. 

Considering  our  own  requirements,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  ter- 
rain along  our  Atlantic  Coast  is  not  so  favorable  to  the  defense 
as  that  of  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  as  the  landing  beaches  are  nu- 
merous and  extensive  and  the  ground  in  rear  is  generally  favorable 
for  an  advance.  Moreover,  our  coast  is  too  extended  to  permit  the 
preparation  of  defenses  in  advance  at  all  possible  landing  places. 
There  is  consequently  the  more  necessity  for  mobile  troops. 

With  a  well-trained  and  equipped  force  equal  or  superior  to  the 
force  that  had  succeeded  in  landing,  the  operations  on  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula  lead  us  to  believe  that  an  advance  from  the  beach  away 
from  the  cover  of  the  ships,  can  be  prevented;  but  without  such  a 
force,  once  the  outer  line  of  defense  at  the  beach  has  been  penetrated, 
the  forces  must  be  withdrawn  to  some  thoroughly  prepared  position 
covering  the  objective  of  the  enemy.  Unless  such  a  position  of  suit- 
able extent  has  been  prepared  in  advance,  further  resistance  is  hope- 
less. 

513 

o 


I 


:-! 


PAT.  JAN.  21.  1908 


6  67370 


A 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  UBRARY 


